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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
AFTER LOWENFIELD: THE ALLEN 
CHARGE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Shawn B. Jensen* 
When a jury becomes deadlocked and cannot reach a ver-
dict for lack of unanimity, federal district courts often attempt 
to break the jury's deadlock by giving a supplemental instruc-
·tion, usually called an "Allen charge," which urges the jurors to 
reconsider their views in order to attain a unanimous verdict. 
This article reviews the use of this type of supplemental instruc-
tion in the Ninth Circuit. Principally the article analyzes the ap-
proach previously taken by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in upholding Allen charges. It then evaluates the impact of 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, the recent Supreme Court case addressing 
the subject. The article concludes by suggesting how the Ninth 
Circuit would review an Allen charge on appeal in determining 
whether the charge should be upheld. 
I. EVOLUTION OF THE ALLEN CHARGE IN THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT 
Juries which fail to reach a verdict because they are dead-
locked are often given an "Allen charge." The "Allen charge" 
gets its name from a case decided nearly a century ago, Allen v. 
United States/ where the Supreme Court upheld a supplemen-
tal jury instruction which urged the members of a deadlocked 
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jury to reconsider their views in order to reach a verdict.2 In its 
simplest forin, an "Allen charge"3 is a supplemental jury in-
struction given after jurors have stopped deliberating because 
they cannot agree on a verdict and further deliberation appears 
to be superfluous. The Allen charge, or a similar supplemental 
instruction,· urges jurors to reconsider their views so that a ver-
dict can be attained. When the instruction is given in a criminal 
case and the result is a conviction because the deadlock which 
would have resulted in a hung jury with no verdict has been 
transformed into a verdict of guilty, the principal contention on 
appeal is that the verdict was unconstitutionally coerced. Ii 
One of the earliest Ninth Circuit cases in which a supple-
mental instruction was challenged as being too coercive was Pe-
terson u. United States,S where five co-defendants charged" with 
buying and receiving stolen property. Ironically, Peterson was a 
retrial after the first resulted in a hung jury. On retrial, defend-
ant Peterson was found guilty while the remaining defendants 
2. [d. at 501. 
3. The "Allen charge" gets its name from the Supreme Court decision of Allen v. 
United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). It is also commonly referred to as a "dynamite 
charge" or "nitroglycerine charge" because it blasts a verdict out of the jury. See ABA 
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To TRIAL 
By JURY, 151 (1968). 
4. The terms "supplemental instruction," "Allen-type instruction," "Allen charge" 
and "modified Allen charge" are used interchangeably. However, such a supplemental 
instruction mayor may not use the identical language approved in Allen. In fact, the 
Allen opinion did not reiterate the lengthy language contained in the supplemental in-
struction. Instead, the opinion simply cited to Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1 
(1851), saying the instruction was taken literally from that case. Allen 164 U.S. at 501. 
Today, in both civil and criminal trials, courts generally refer to an "Allen charge" as 
any type of instruction, given after the jury has had some time to deliberate, which in 
some way urges the jurors to reach a verdict while cautioning them not to give up an 
"honest conviction" about the defendant's guilt or innocence. The instruction may be a 
few short sentences or several pages in length. See e.g., Seawell v. United States, 550 
F.2d 1159, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977)(Seawell I)(form of Allen instruction used was almost 
one thousand words in length); see also DEVITT & BLACKMAR. FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE 
AND INSTRUCTIONS. § 18.14 (3d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1987). 
5. While an Allen-type instruction may be given in a civil case, this article evaluates 
the use of this type of instruction only in criminal cases. In a criminal case the instruc-
tion would primarily implicate the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury and the 
fifth amendment right to due process of law. In a civil case the constitutional claims 
would primarily rest upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the sev-
enth amendment right to a trial by jury. However, the Supreme Court has analyzed Al-
len instructions under the same standard without respect to the constitutional basis 
alleged. 
6. 213 F. 920 (9th Cir. 1914). 
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were acquitted.7 The trial took three days. When the jury had 
reached a deadlock after nearly two days of deliberation, the dis-
trict court took a poll to determine how the jury was divided.8 It 
then gave a supplemental instruction which included the admo-
nitions that this was the second trial, justice was expensive to 
the government and that with their seven-to-five deadlock the 
five jurors should seriously inquire whether there was a reasona-
ble doubt when the other seven jurors had no doubt.9 A guilty 
verdict was announced less than one hour after the supplemen-
tal instruction was given.1o On appeal the Ninth Circuit over-
turned the conviction. Without considering the Supreme Court's 
decision in Allen, the Ninth Circuit found that the statements 
included in the supplemental instruction were "plainly coer-
cive."ll Specifically, the court found the instruction was unduly 
coercive because it did not caution the jurors against yielding 
honest conclusions of innocence and incorrectly stated that the 
government had a "right" to a verdict.12 The court also consid-
ered two other factors in determining that the instruction was 
too coercive: first, the complexity of the case, with the court 
finding the crime of buying and receiving stolen property to be 
easy to understand; and second, the length of deliberations after 
the supplemental instruction, with less than one hour being very 
brief. 18 
Peterson must be read in light of Suslak v. United States,14 
which was decided just seven days earlier and should be re-
garded as a companion case. In Suslak a supplemental instruc-
tion was upheld despite the fact that the district court itself 
took the initiative to recall the jury to give the charge.16 The 
complexity of the case and the length of subsequent delibera-
tions were not considered. Instead, the decision to affirm the 
guilty verdict was based exclusively on the language used in the 
supplemental charge. The instruction in Suslak cautioned the 
jurors not to "take an arbitrary stand to acquit or convict a 
7. Id. at 921. 
8. Id. at 924. 
9.Id. 
10. Id. at 926. 
11. Id. at 924. 
12. Id. at 925. 
13. [d. at 925-26. 
14. 213 F. 913 (9th Cir. 1914). 
15. Id. at 919. 
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man."16 This exclusive rationale was inconsistent with Peterson 
which required the complexity of the case and the length of sub-
sequent deliberations to also be considered. 
Shea u. United States,17 which followed Peterson and Sus-
lak, added even more confusion to the use of supplemental in-
structions. In upholding a supplemental instruction, Shea ex-
plicitly relied on Allen, reasoning that the authority of the 
Supreme Court controlled. IS Shea had argued that the guilty 
verdict was nevertheless unduly coerced because the instruction 
was the result of the district court's own initiative rather than 
the jurors" announcement that they were deadlocked.19 However, 
the court found the instruction's content, as opposed to context, 
was the determinative factor. 2o Peterson was distinguished on 
the ground that there the district court made the fatal mistake 
of inquiring as to how the jurors were divided.21 In this, it would 
appear that if the district court inquired about the jury's numer-
ical division by polling the jury, the jurors in the minority would 
be singled out and therefore were more susceptible to the coer-
cive effect of a supplemental instruction. 
Seven years later, the Supreme Court directly addressed the 
issue of jury polling in Brasfield u. United States.22 In Brasfield, 
when the jurors reached deadlock, the district court judge asked 
the jurors how they were divided. When they stated, "nine to 
three," further deliberation was ordered and a guilty verdict re-
sulted.23 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, reasoning 
that when juror polling was conducted, coercion was much more 
likely to exist.24 
16. [d. at 919. Suslak should also be read for its portrayal of the early western min-
ing days. Suslak was convicted of transporting a woman to Butte, Montana for immoral 
purposes. The testimony was colorful, with the prosecutrix stating that she entered a life 
of open prostitution soon after coming to Butte, and that having gotten the reputation of 
a harlot, she thought she might as well live the life and make some money. [d. at 916. 
17. 260 F. 807 (9th Cir. 1919). 
18. [d. at 809. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 808-09. 
21. [d. at 809. 
22. 272 U.S. 448 (1926). 
23. [d. at 455. 
24. [d. at 455. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 
459-62 (1978)(jury foreman referred to the jury's deadlock during an ex parte meeting 
with the judge, with the strong likelihood that the foreman carried away the impression 
4
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Thirty years after Brasfield the Ninth Circuit again upheld 
a modified Allen instruction in Hudson v. United States,2r. 
under the exclusive rationale that the supplemental instruction 
contained a "correct statement of the law."26 Hudson therefore 
became the cornerstone decision which established that a proper 
supplemental instruction in effect consisted of one ele-
ment-advising the jurors to reconsider their views but not to 
give up their "honest convictions."27 The court relegated the 
complexity of the case, the length of deliberations, whether the 
charge may have been directed at particular jurors, and the ad-
ditional language which may have been included in the charge, 
to insignificant considerations.28 While this analysis was con-
trary to Suslak and Peterson, subsequent cases reaffirmed the 
Hudson approach. As long as the supplemental instruction or 
Allen charge contained the "magic words," i.e., the admonition 
that jurors in the minority should not give up an honest or con-
scientious position on guilt or innocence, it was upheld.29 
In short, the Ninth Circuit came to uphold Allen-type in-
structions based on the "magic words" alone. While this was 
consistent with the narrow holding of Allen, it did little to ad-
dress other factors which clearly indicated coercion of jurors in 
the minority despite the content of the instruction, such as the 
complexity of the case in relation to the length of deliberations, 
use of vociferous language by the jurors in describing the dead-
lock and the length of deliberations after the supplemental in-
struction was given. 
A change came in Powell v. United States,30 where a convic-
tion was reversed where use of a supplemental instruction 
caused juror coercion.31 But, the important aspect of Powell is 
that the judge wanted a verdict one way or the other). 
25. 238 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1956). 
26. [d. at 173. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. See Miracle v. United States, 411 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (instruc-
tion emphasized that each juror should arrive at his own decision); Dearinger v. United 
States, 378 F.2d 346 (9th Cir.)(instruction told jurors not to surrender a conscientious 
conviction), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 855 (1967); Christy v. United States, 261 F.2d 357 (9th 
Cir. 1958)(instruction included warning to the jurors not to surrender conscientious con-
viction), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 919 (1959). 
30. 347 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1965). 
31. [d. at 158. 
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that no "additional" supplemental instruction was given. In-
stead the district court simply reread one of the original instruc-
tions which delineated the elements of the crime charged.82 A 
guilty verdict was reached five minutes thereafter. The Ninth 
Circuit reversed the conviction, stating that the test for review-
ing a supplemental charge was "whether the charge taken as a 
whole was such as to confuse or leave an erroneous impression 
on the minds of the jurors."88 As a result, Powell stands as a 
case upon which convicted defendants may rely to overturn a 
guilty verdict, if they can show clear coercion from the factual 
context despite the content of the language used in the supple-
mental instruction. 
The salient fact showing coercion is of course the time 
elapsed between when the supplemental instruction is given and 
the return of the verdict. However, Powell was decided shortly 
before the Supreme Court rendered its two page opinion in Jen-
kins v. United States.84 In Jenkins a conviction was reversed 
where the district court's response to the jurors sending a note 
indicating they were unable to agree on a verdict was to tell 
them, "You have got to reach a decision in this case."811 Presum-
ably, a "decision" could have been an acquittal. Despite this, the 
Supreme Court looked at the supplemental instruction "in its 
context and under all the circumstances" to find that there was 
a coercive effect.88 But, the Court did not indicate whether in-
clusion of the magic words would by themselves cause the sup-
plemental instruction to be upheld. 
However, in Jenkins the Supreme Court did establish the 
test for reviewing an Allen charge in the Ninth Circuit; whether 
in its context and under all the circumstances there was a coer-
cive effect. This was a departure from Hudson and prior Ninth 
Circuit cases which appeared to look solely to the "magic words" 
of admonishing jurors not to forgo honest convictions.87 
As expected though, the short instruction used in Jenkins 
32. [d. at 157. 
33. [d. at 158. 
34. 380 U.S. 445 (1965)(per curiam). 
35. [d. 446. 
36. [d. 
37. Supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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gave rise to the next question: What if no supplemental instruc-
tions were given, but upon deadlock the district judge simply 
sent the jurors back for further deliberation? In Walsh v. 
United States,38 the Ninth Circuit answered this question by 
finding that in such a case no juror coercion existed because no 
jurors were singled out to change their views.39 Jenkins was ex-
plicitly distinguished on this ground,40 albeit over a vociferous 
dissent which argued that minority jurors were in effect singled 
out because it was clearly implied that a guilty verdict was 
required.41 
This gave rise to the next obvious question of whether the 
timing alone of the supplemental instruction could be the basis 
for reversing a guilty verdict. In Sullivan v. United States,42 the 
question was sidestepped. An Allen charge which was given sua 
sponte before any indication by the jurors that a deadlock had 
been reached was upheld because it contained the magic 
words.43 The timing of the charge, with respect to it being given 
sua sponte, was left unaddressed, apparently because the con-
tent had once again become the determinative factor in evaluat-
ing an Allen charge.44 Yet only three years later, in Contreras v. 
United States,46 where a sua sponte Allen charge was given, a 
conviction was reversed on the basis that the charge was so pre-
mature it clearly coerced the resulting guilty verdict!6 While the 
court declined to hold that an Allen charge was unduly coercive 
per se and thereby prohibit its use in the Ninth Circuit,47 the 
court did hold that where there was no indication of juror dead-
lock, an Allen charge should be used only where "clearly war-
38. 371 F.2d 135 (9th Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967). 
39. [d. at 136. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. at 137, (Browning, J., dissenting)(arguing that where it is implied that the 
jury must reach a verdict, jurors relinquish their personal views in the interest of 
unanimity). 
42. 414 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1969). 
43. [d. at 717. 
44. [d. at 717-19. 
45. 463 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972)(per curiam). 
46. [d. at 775. 
47. The power of the circuit court to prohibit the use of Allen-type charges would 
come under the federal courts' supervisory powers to formulate procedual rules. See 
United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)(federal courts may formulate proce-
dural rules not specifically required by the constitution or Congress). 
7
Jensen: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
82 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:75 
ranted."48 Arguably "clearly warranted" would mean nothing 
less than jury notification to the court that they had actually 
reached a stalemate. 
With the inconsistencies rendered by the Court of Appeals 
and the myriad of different factual nuances that could be con-
fronted in any given case where supplemental instructions were 
used, by 1976 the district courts of the Ninth Circuit were trying 
a new approach. This involved including an instruction which 
encouraged the jurors to reach a verdict as part of the original 
instructions.49 The language used was essentially that approved 
in Allen, containing the "magic words" which cautioned all ju-
rors to reconsider their views but not to forgo honest convic-
tions. Also, by giving the instruction initially instead of after a 
48. Contreras, 463 F.2d at 774. 
49. The Ninth Circuit not only permitted but in fact encouraged district courts to 
send a copy of the instructions into the jury room for use during deliberations. Although 
in doing so it was imperative that all proper instructions be included. Leaving out an 
essential instruction would invite error. See e.g., United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 320 
(9th Cir. 1976). In Miller, it was stated: 
Based upon experiences as a trial lawyer in state and federal 
courts and shared experiences with trial lawyers, judges and 
jurors, this author is firmly of the opinion that sending all in-
structions to the jury room at the commencement of delibera-
tions is manifestly sound. It would serve to prevent claims of 
error and reversals of this nature. Jurors would not be left to 
their own conflicting memories as to the precise and important 
wording of the instructions. It eliminates the danger of over-
emphasizing a few instructions or aspects of the case when re-
quests for rereading are received and granted. The danger of 
the jury seizing upon one instruction as stating the law of the 
case or of seizing upon an erroneous view of what the instruc-
tions as a whole were meant to convey is infinitely greater 
when jurors are left to their memories. We do (and properly 
so) rely on jurors to follow instructions on the law of the case 
and not to select one as stating the law, but to consider them 
as a whole. The fulfillment of this admonition and objective is 
greatly enhanced when the jury is afforded "the right" to have 
the instructions with them during deliberations. Where, as 
here, there are numerous general rules, complicated conspiracy 
and substantive count instructions and the jury is in recess for 
an extended period, the danger of a miscarriage of justice 
based upon a faulty recollection of the instructions is inherent. 
That danger is eliminated by giving the jury the 'keys' to a 
proper result based on the facts they find to exist in a given 
case. 
[d. at 324 n.3. See also United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1981)("It is 
the better practice to include a version of [the Allen instruction] in the jury's original 
instructions. "). 
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stalemate was reached, it was thought that jurors would reexam-
ine their positions without being coerced into arriving at a guilty 
verdict. llo In this way an Allen charge as an original instruction 
would offer the best of both worlds-causing unanimity without 
causing coercion upon jurors in the minority. 
Problems with this approach soon arose. The most recurrent 
being how to respond to the jurors' deadlock when they vocifer-
ously described it, such as a jury's notice to the court that it was 
"hopelessly deadlocked," and what to do when a jury became 
deadlocked despite an Allen charge being used as part of the 
original instructions. 
The vociferousness of a particular response by a jury when 
it had reached deadlock was evaluated in United States v. Pe-
terson,lIl where after one-half day of deliberation the jurors re-
ported, "we are deadlocked. "112 The district court returned the 
jury for further deliberation. After a second day of deliberation 
the jury again reported it was "hopelessly deadlocked."113 At this 
point an Allen-type charge was given. That same afternoon a 
guilty verdict was returned. II. In affirming the conviction, the 
Ninth Circuit applied the "general standard" to determine 
whether the Allen charge was coercive considering "all circum-
stances of the case."1I1I Finding no coercion, the circuit court spe-
cifically held that a jury's expression of being "hopelessly dead-
locked" was not determinative. liS 
This rule appears to be beyond dispute. No matter how em-
phatic the jury's expression that it is deadlockedll7 and presuma-
50. See e.g., United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1976)(because the 
district court on Monday morning reread instructions given Friday afternoon but ne-
glected to reread the instruction cautioning that an accomplice's testimony must be 
weighed with great care, reversible error resulted). 
51. 549 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1977). 
52. Id. at 659. 
53.Id. 
54.Id. 
55.Id. 
56.Id. 
57. See e.g., United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977)(Seawell I). In 
Seawell I, the jury informed the court: "[tJhe jury is at a ten-to-two impasse. The two 
state that nothing we can say will convince them otherwise." [d. at 1160. The district 
court gave an Allen charge with the jury returning a second note stating in part: 
No amount of argument has persuaded their convictions, these 
are the others who do not agree with the majority of the ju-
9
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bly even if it reveals the numerical breakdown of the jurors' 
votes, this will not in itself require a later guilty verdict to be 
overturned. However, when a jury's response is particularly em-
phatic, it could be argued that this is a substantial factor to be 
evaluated in determining coerciveness. 
A restriction on use of the Allen charge is the finding of 
coercion where the charge was given more than once. But multi-
ple use of the charge mayor may not include use of the Allen 
charge as part of the original instruction. For example, in 
United States v. Seawell/'s an Allen charge was given when im-
passe was reached after two and one-half hours of deliberation. 
When over three more hours of deliberation failed to result in a 
verdict, the charge was reread to the jury.IIP The result was a 
guilty verdict one hour later.so In reversing the conviction, the 
appellate court held that using the Allen charge twice was an 
unwarranted expansion of its use.S1 This holding was based on 
the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury, but review of 
the charge was still made under the Jenkins test of "all the cir-
cumstances," which included the content and timing of the 
charge.52 However, the court failed to further address the issue 
of multiple use of the Allen charge and analyze whether use of 
the charge as part of an original instruction would constitute 
multiple use thereby requiring reversal of a guilty verdict. 
rors. We therefore submit to you that we are at impasse and 
are not likely to change our minds until fatigue becomes a de-
ciding factor which we believe is neither fair to the defendant 
or the people. 
Id. See also United States v. Bonam, 772 F.2d 1449, 1450 (9th Cir. 1985)(jury note say-
ing, "At this time, we the jury are unable to reach a unanimous verdict" and a second 
note four hours later saying, "We the jury are at a stalemate and opinion cannot be 
altered. The situation has not changed since 11:00 a.m. Nothing is going to change. 
Please advise."); United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 883 (9th Cir. 1983)(after denying 
dismissal of one juror, a second note from the jury stated, "Another juror wants to be 
released. We seem to be at a standoff, and she feels that there is no clear end in sight."), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984); United States v. Hooton, 662 F.2d 628, 636 (9th Cir. 
1981)(juror note to the court stated, "Please send us home. Some of us have family obli-
gations, i.e., children at home alone."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1982); United States 
v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 1981)(jury stated it was "having problems"); 
United States v. Cassasa, 588 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1978)(jury reported it was at a 
"standstill"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979). 
58. 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977)(Seawell I). 
59. Id. at 1162. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1163. 
62.Id. 
10
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When Seawell was retried, an Allen charge was again used 
before a verdict could be reached.63 The conviction on retrial 
was allowed to stand.64 Finding Jenkins controlling, use of the 
Allen charge was found not to be error per se, and without the 
"unusual circumstances of coercion," the verdict was upheld.611 
But, an emphatic concurrence called for the demise of the Allen-
charge circuit-wide.66 
Subsequent cases followed suit. Without a showing of "un-
usual circumstances" of coercion, use of the Allen charge was 
upheld.67 Primary importance was therefore placed on the con-
63. United States v. Seawell, 583 F.2d 416, 417 (9th Cir.)(Seawell IJ), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 991 (1978). 
64. ld. at 418. 
65. ld. 
66. ld. at 419, (Hug, J., concurring)(Judge Hug argued that an Allen charge was 
unduly coercive regardless of its timing, and also that the charge misstated the law inso-
far as it indicated a second trial would be necessary if a verdict could not be reached. 
But, feeling constrained by existing case law, Judge Hug felt compelled to concur in the 
result absent reversal of the established case law by the court sitting en banc). 
Other judges have also voiced their regret in upholding Allen charges. See e.g., Arm-
strong v. United States, 654 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1981)(Merrill, J., concur-
ring)(cautioning that some Allen charges sound like a reproof to the jury for ending in a 
deadlock), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); Beattie v. United States, 613 F.2d 762, 766 
(9th Cir.)(Browning, C.J., concurring)(suggesting that the line between admonishing the 
jury to keep trying and encouraging jurors to surrender their beliefs is extremely fine), 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980). At least three other circuits had disapproved modified 
Allen charges. See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3rd Cir.)(Alien charge 
constitutes an unwarranted judicial invasion into the province of the jury), cert. denied 
sub nom Panaccione v. United States, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); United States v. Brown, 411 
F.2d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1969)(Allen charge allowed if it is consistent with the ABA rec-
ommended standards), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); United States v. Thomas, 449 
F.2d 1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(Allen charge must contain the same language as the 
ABA approved instruction). However, in light of Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S.Ct. 546 
(1988), use of the Allen charge is now authoritatively established. See infra note 79 and 
accompanying text. 
67. See Bonam v. United States, 772 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1985)(upholding charge 
which said a juror should not abandon his conscientiously held views); Armstrong v. 
United States, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding "mild" Allen charge), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); Guglielmine v. United States, 598 F.2d 1149 (9th 
Cir.)(approving ABA Standard Instruction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1974); Weiner v. 
United States, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.)(per curiam)(modified Allen charge allowed), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); Silla v. United States, 555 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1977)(use of 
Allen charge upheld under version given in Devitt & Blackmar). Under Seawelll, the 
only "unusual circumstance" sufficient to overturn a conviction in which an Allen charge 
was used, was repeated use of the instruction. However, a question remains on the use of 
anA lien-type charge as part of the original instructions, which is then used again as a 
supplemental instruction. Original and supplemental use only once would have required 
reversal under Seawell I but presumably not under Lowenfield. See infra note 87 and 
accompanying text. 
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tent as opposed to the context of the charge. The Supreme 
Court then re-addressed the use of the Allen charge and author-
itatively established the current standard by which it is to be 
evaluated. 
II. THE LOWENFIELD v. PHELPS DECISION 
With the circuit courts taking divergent views on the appli-
cation of Allen,B8 the Supreme Court decided to review the con-
tinuing validity of the case. In Lowenfield v. Phelps,B9 the Court 
upheld a modified Allen instruction and thereby reaffirmed the 
use of supplemental instructions which urge jurors to arrive at a 
unanimous decision.70 
The facts of Lowenfield are unique and give rise to ques-
tions which will arise in light of the existing Ninth Circuit case 
law. Lowenfield was charged with five counts' of murder.71 A 
guilty verdict was reached. The jury then commenced sentencing 
deliberations, prior to which the district court admonished the 
jurors to consider the views of others with the objective of reach-
ing a verdict, but that they should not surrender their own hon-
est beliefs in doing SO.72 The following day the jury notified the 
court that it was unable to reach a decision on the appropriate 
penalty.73 The trial court then took an anonymous poll of the 
jury to determine the usefulness of further deliberations on the 
sentence. The poll revealed that eight jurors were in favor of fur-
ther deliberations." Accordingly, the court directed further de-
liberation to determine the appropriate sentence. Later, the ju-
rors notified the court that they had misunderstood the polling 
question. The trial court again anonymously polled the jurors to 
get their views on whether further deliberations would be help-
ful. 7G Only one juror answered affirmatively. The court then rein-
68. See, e.g., Williams v. Parke, 741 F.2d 847, 850 (6th Cir. 1984)(variation of the 
charged used in Allen imperils the validity of the verdict), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029; 
United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1971) (Allen charge should be used 
with great caution and only when absolutely necessary). 
69. 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988). 
70. [d. at 552. 
71. [d. at 548. 
72. [d. at 549. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. 
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structed the jury with a modified Allen charge which stated in 
part: "Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and to 
change your opinion if you are convinced you are wrong but do 
not surrender your honest belief as to the weight and effect of 
evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or 
for the purpose of returning a verdict. "78 The jury resumed de-
liberations and thirty minutes later returned with a death sen-
tence on three of the murder counts." 
Lowenfield appealed the sentence on the ground the sen-
tence was coerced out of the jury.78 The guilt determination it-
self was not similarly appealed. In reviewing Lowenfield's sen-
tence, the Supreme Court relied on Jenkins and Allen, stating 
that the validity of the use of supplemental instructions was 
"beyond dispute."79 The test used for evaluating coercion was 
whether the charge was "coercive in its content and under all 
the circumstances. "80 
In examining the facts, the Supreme Court found them in-
sufficient to establish coercion. The Court particularly relied on 
the anonymity of the jury poll, pointing out that the poll was 
used to determine the usefulness of further deliberations as dis-
tinguished from a poll to determine the jurors' positions on the 
sentence itself.81 Brasfield was specifically distinguished on the 
ground that it involved a jury poll which had the purpose of de-
termining how the jurors were divided on the merits as opposed 
the determining whether the jurors thought further delibera-
tions would be helpful.82 Additionally, Jenkins was distin-
guished on the ground that it involved a supplemental instruc-
tion which did not contain the magic words urging the jurors not 
to surrender an honest belief.83 With respect to the fact that the 
sentencing verdict was returned only 30 minutes after the sup-
76.Id. 
77.Id. 
78. Id. at 550. 
79. Id. at 550-51. 
80. Id. at 550. 
81. Id. at 552. 
82.Id. 
83. Id. at 551, citing Jenkins. It should be noted that the eighth amendment chal-
lenge to the Allen charge made in Lowen/ield would not have arisen in a federal court 
because the sentences for criminal defendants in federal courts are determined by a 
judge and not a jury. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32; 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 
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plemental charge was given, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
the defense counsel's failure to immediately object to the sen-
tence indicated that coercion was not readily apparent.84 
III. THE ALLEN CHARGE AFTER LOWENFIELD 
Lowenfield will have significant implications on the supple-
mental instruction law of the Ninth Circuit. The greatest impli-
cation is that it authoritatively reaffirmed Allen and reestab-
lished the standard for reviewing supplemental instructions 
urging that a verdict be reached. 
Additionally, Lowenfield addressed the coercion issue under 
the due process clause as well as the eighth amendment. By 
finding no fifth or eight amendment violations, there is no rea-
son to believe the sixth amendment right to a fair trial would 
require a different result.811 However, the Supreme Court limited 
the Lowenfield holding to the facts of the case, pointing out that 
"other combinations of supplemental charges and polling [may] 
require a different conclusion."88 Yet, given the facts involved in 
Lowenfield, it is hard to imagine a more coercive set of circum-
stances than those involved in Lowenfield, other than the failure 
to use the magic words in the supplemental charge.87 
The Lowenfield decision will also have implications upon 
the repetitive use of supplemental instructions which urge the 
jurors to reach a verdict. Lowenfield upheld use of supplemental 
charges both to achieve a verdict and to determine the appropri-
ate sentence. Therefore, using an Allen charge more than once 
would presumably not amount to an unwarranted expansion of 
84. Lowenfield, 108 S. Ct. at 552. Failure to object did not waive the issue on appeal. 
However, for counsel practicing in the Ninth Circuit, objection should be made to pre-
serve the alleged error for appeal. If there is a failure to object, reversal is required only 
if the error constitutes plain error. United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 
1986). Since Lowenfield held the supplemental instruction did not rise to a constitu-
tional violation, plain error will not exist. 
85. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
86. Lowenfield, 108 S. Ct. at 552. 
87. See Lowenfield, 108 S. Ct. at 555-58, (Marshall, J., dissenting)(reciting a more 
compelling version of the facts than that recited by the majority; including, inter alia, 
the point that at the jury was instructed four times that failure to reach a verdict on the 
sentence would automatically result in a life sentence). 
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its use.88 This is contrary to Seawell I which found that repeat-
ing an Allen instruction amounted to unconstitutional juror co-
ercion. But, if the charge is repeated more than once during any 
separate phase of the trial, Lowenfield could be substantially 
distinguishable on this basis and Seawell I would arguably re-
quire reversaP9 
With respect to jury polling, Lowenfield is consistent with 
previous Ninth Circuit cases. If polling is done in a manner that 
maintains anonymity, coercion will not be found. However, if the 
division in the jury is revealed, particularly because of court in-
quiry rather than by the jurors' voluntary revelation, this cir-
cumstance should be sufficient to demonstrate coercion under 
the Supreme Court's decision in Brasfield and analogous Ninth 
Circuit decisions.90 
Other circumstances in which issues may arise in the con-
text of a supplemental instruction were not addressed by the 
Lowenfield court. The time period involved in Lowenfield be-
tween giving the supplemental instruction and the verdict was 
thirty minutes. It is therefore possible that where the jury delib-
erates for an exceptionally short period of time after a supple-
mental instruction is given, i.e., thirty minutes or less, reversal 
could result. Given this obtuse time line, future Ninth Circuit 
cases are likely to focus on the different factors which implicate 
the time-line drawing; such as the complexity of the case, the 
total time spent on deliberations, the degree of finality in the 
jury's communication with the court that it is deadlocked, and 
whether the supplemental instruction is given sua sponte or 
only after a deadlock is reached and the jury informs the court 
that it is at stalemate. 
While each of these facts can be argued in the course of an 
Allen charge appeal, one thing is clear. With Lowenfield reaf-
88. Id. 
89. Lowen/ield involved a supplemental instruction used during both the sentencing 
phase and during the guilt phase, where the trial court stated, "I order you to go back to 
the jury room and deliberate and arrive at a verdict." [d. at 557, (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Ironically, previous Ninth Circuit case law would have required that the verdict be 
invalidated because the instruction did not contain the magic words. However, the ma-
jority opinion did not analyze the supplemental instruction used during the guilt phase, 
but limited its analysis to the instruction used during the sentencing phase of the trial. 
90. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
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firming the Jenkins test for review, when an Allen charge does 
include the magic words of admonishing the jurors not to give 
up an honest belief, per se reversal on the ground of juror coer-
cion will be difficult to attain. If the magic words are used, many 
separate facts showing juror coercion will have to exist so that 
their cumulative effects can overcome an otherwise permissible 
supplemental instruction. In short, content will predominate 
over context. 
The Allen charge is used because it is effective. It pushes 
jurors to reach a verdict. Absent a showing of facts demonstrat-
ing that the will of individual jurors was compromised, a guilty 
verdict in the Ninth Circuit which resulted from the use of a 
properly worded Allen charge will be allowed to stand. 
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